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Arguably the fastest growing branches of political science at present are 
transitology and its close relation consolidology1. These are concerned with 
the comparative study of transition from authoritarian systems and towards 
something different, usually assumed to be democracy2. For many transitolo- 
gists, the centre of attention in the 1990s has been the once communist states of 
eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (hereafter FSU). One sign of the 
interest was the establishment in the UK during 1996 of 33 new posts relating 
to these countries. Another is that some of the best-known scholars in political 
science have in recent years concerned themselves with various comparative 
aspects of transition and/or consolidation3 in the post-communist world, in­
cluding Jean Blondel (e.g. 1997), Giuseppe Di Palma (e.g. 1991), Jon Elster 
(e.g. 1996), Claus Offe (e.g. 1996), Adam Przeworski (e.g. 1991, 1995), 
Richard Rose (e.g. Rose and Haerpfer 1994a), and the recently-appointed 
Gladstone Professor of Government at Oxford, Alfred Stepan (e.g. Linz and 
Stepan 1996). By 1997, they and many others have produced a huge literature, 
both comparative and focused on individual countries, on these transitions and 
consolidations. Yet despite the addition of so much intellectual weight, and 
several highly stimulating books and articles, there is a need for still more 
theorising of the démocratisation project4, as distinct from detailed analyses of 
the roles of various state agencies that only implicitly compare actual devel­
opments against an abstract model of democracy. The main purpose of this 
paper is to contribute in a very small way to a plugging of this theoretical gap.
The paper begins with a brief exploration of what is often perceived as the 
most fundamental political problem of the transitions, the apparent contradic­
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the New 
Zealand Political Studies Association in Auckland, July 1996.1 am grateful to the various 
participants at that conference who, via both questions and comments, helped me to re­
fine the argument. I also wish to thank my colleague John Dryzek for his invaluable 
comments on the earlier version; for some of his own writing on democracy see Dryzek 
1990 and Dryzek 1996.
2 For a debate on the validity of transitology and consolidology see Schmitter and Karl 
1994; Karl and Schmitter 1995; Bunce 1995a and 1995b; Markwick 1996.
3 In the conclusions, it is argued that consolidation should be seen as the second stage of 
transition, not a successor to it; it follows from this that consolidology should be treated 
as a subdivision of transitology, not as a separate exercise.




























































































tion between the practical need for strong leadership on the one hand, and the 
normative and putative commitment of elites to démocratisation on the other. 
In an important sense, this apparent contradiction is the basis of the title of this 
paper; this will be explored below. Following this is a suggested skeletal model 
of democracy against which to test actual developments. In the third section, 
such developments are considered in reference to the model. This leads to the 
conclusions. These focus on some of the problems of determining when differ­
ent stages of the démocratisation process have been reached and the practical 
difficulties of creating a strong state under early post-communism.
The ‘Need’ for Strong Leadership and State Democracy
At least three related arguments are frequently adduced in claiming there is 
a need for strong leadership in post-communist countries.
First, it is often maintained that since none of these countries had much 
tradition of democracy, it will take both citizens and officials (here including 
politicians) time to learn the norms of democratic behaviour. These states and 
societies are sometimes described as ‘infantilised’ (see e.g. Schopflin 1993, 24; 
Hankiss 1994, 117). While some communist states were more liberal than oth­
ers (with Yugoslavia and Hungary at one end of the spectrum, Romania and 
Albania at the other), and while some, such as the USSR and Hungary, took 
significant strides in these directions in the 1980s, none had genuine political 
competition, free media, or a dominant political culture based on the rule of 
law and the legitimacy of self-motivated citizen participation. Moreover, none 
had had long-term, successful experience of democracy prior to communist 
power; Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, the GDR are the only partial 
exceptions to this general statement.
Second, the post-communist states are attempting transitions on a scale and 
at a pace without precedent. While Claus Offe (1991) is quite correct to argue 
there are three transitions occurring (political, economic, territorial/bound- 
ary) in early post-communism, his list is incomplete. For instance, a social 
transformation is underway; given the underlying ideological assumptions of 
post-communist politicians (of almost all political hues), the new economies 
require bourgeoisies that were virtually non-existent just a few years ago. 




























































































in the post-communist world5, given the near-absence of a capitalist class at 
the end of the 1980s.
Creating new classes is only one of the additional transformations. There is 
also the international realignment of the post-communist states. With the sole 
exceptions of Yugoslavia and Albania, all the communist states of Eastern 
Europe and the USSR were members of the same military alliance (the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation or WTO) and economic bloc (the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance or CMEA). In the 1990s, following the collapse 
of both the WTO and the CMEA, most of the east European states have sought 
membership of NATO and the EU.
Then there is the need for a thoroughgoing transformation of the legal sys­
tem. If it is accepted that most Western conceptions of law are based on the 
assumptions of the sanctity of the individual and the related notion of the right 
to private property, it soon becomes obvious why post-communist systems 
have to implement wholesale changes in legal culture and structures.
Finally, there is the need for ideological and ethical transformation — for 
the construction of a new value system. This is that much greater in societies 
which had by many criteria been partocracies and ideocracies, and in which 
the contradictions between the putatively omniscient ideology (of Marxism- 
Leninism) and elite behaviour had seriously undermined the potential for mass 
faith in any ideology or structured belief-system6. All this helps to explain the 
dramatic rise in crime in so many post-communist states in the 1990s7
In sum, the sheer scale of the changes, plus the perceived need to implement 
them as quickly as possible if they are to succeed, is often cited in support of 
arguments for strong leadership.
The third factor is more controversial, and at first sight might appear to be 
contradictory. It can be argued that strong leadership is required to establish 
democracy and avoid dictatorship. If it is accepted that a key feature of the 
states under consideration here is the absence of an established culture of com­
promise (which is a ramification of the first factor listed above), then the 
comprehensiveness of transmutation required (our second factor) helps to
5 See the estimates of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development published in 
The European, 21-7 October 1994, 18
6 For a polemical analysis of the post-communist social, ethical and ideological vacuum see 
Hall 1995.




























































































explain why too much so-called ‘democracy’ (often near-anarchy) in the early 
stages of transition might be not merely inefficient and frustrating but even 
counter-productive and dangerous. The chaos in Russia during the 1990s that 
resulted in so many Russians voting in the June-July 1996 presidential elections 
for hardliners committed to the restoration of ‘order’ and national pride** is 
one of the clearest indications of this. The year 1996 saw Russia move closer 
to the possibility of dictatorship than it had been since August 1991 or 
September-October 1993; the difference this time was that it would have come 
about as the result of a popular decision8 9.
Although Russia might appear to be the best example of the possibilities of 
‘democracy’10 bringing about dictatorship, this is partly because most of the 
Western media, for understandable reasons, focus far more on Russia than on 
countries such as Kazakhstan, Slovakia or Belarus. After all, Russia is consid­
erably larger and more powerful, and potentially far more threatening to 
international peace. But the apparent contradiction identified here — that in 
transitional societies there is sometimes a need for strong leadership to avoid 
dictatorship — can be seen in many countries. While most readers of the seri­
ous press will be aware that Yeltsin shut down the Russian parliament in 
September 1993, fewer know that Lech Walesa dissolved the Polish parliament 
in May 1993 after the latter had adopted a no-confidence motion in the gov­
ernment of Hanna Suchocka. While the Polish case did not result in the vio-
8 In the first round of the elections, an absolute majority (52.2%) of those that cast their 
vote did so for either Gennadii Zyuganov (32.0%), Aleksandr Lebed (14.5%) or 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii (5.7%) — each of whom, in different ways, represented order, na­
tional pride and strong leadership. In the final (run-off) round between Yeltsin and 
Zyuganov, the latter — who heads the Communist Party of the Russian Federation — se­
cured 40.3% of the valid vote. On the presidential elections see Lentini 1996; White, 
Rose and McAllister 1997, esp.241-70.
9 It will be clear from this statement that I do not accept that liberal democracies are the only 
type of system or regime that can be popularly (democratically) legitimate. In adopting 
this position, I fundamentally disagree with what I interpret Gerd Meyer (1994) to be ar­
guing. However, it is not maintained here that dictatorship can ever be democratic; that 
would be nonsensical. Rather, it is argued that a popularly chosen strong presidential 
system with few checks and balances and a very limited separation or division of powers 
can be popularly legitimate, and in a particular if unusual sense democratic. Except per­
haps in a highly abnormal situation such as an international war, such an arrangement be­
comes a dictatorship the moment the cidzenry loses its absolute right to remove the strong 
president through genuine and normal elections.
10 The word democracy is in inverted commas here because some question the notion that 
Russia is even a nascent democracy, believing it instead to be a disintegrating and quasi- 
anarchic country. Whether or not Russia has a form of democracy is a large question that 
cannot be adequately addressed here; however, it is partly and implicitly answered in the 





























































































lence Üiat was so much a feature of the Russian, the fact is that a president and 
strong leader used extreme powers to deal with a difficult parliament that 
demonstrated neither a willingness to compromise nor sufficient internal 
cohesion (solidarity? pathetic pun intended!) and responsibility to permit the 
adoption of tough measures11.
Considering this third factor from a slightly different perspective, the need 
for strong leadership by the state in this period of fragility is largely a func­
tion of the underdeveloped nature of civil society in most post-communist 
countries. Many have argued that nascent civil society played a significant role 
in bringing down communist power (on this see e.g. Tismaneanu 1990; 
Kukathas, Lovell and Maley 1991; Rau 1991; Lewis 1992; Miller 1992). How­
ever, it was by 1997 being acknowledged by most commentators that much of 
the momentum generated in the late-1980s and early-1990s towards a fully- 
fledged civil society had dissipated. Even though a ‘bourgeois class’ of sorts 
was by this later date becoming visible in many post-communist countries, too 
many of its members were perceived to have criminal connections for it to be 
reasonable to argue that the kind of truly civil society advocated by the late 
Edward Shils (1991) was clearly developing. Moreover, many of the new 
social movements that emerged very rapidly in the final stages of communist 
rule — whether environmentalist, peace-related or feminist — were by the late- 
1990s languishing. Given this weakness of civil society, the state is seen to 
have to play a significant role in setting the parameters for the development of 
democracy.
Before elaborating the meaning of this paper’s title, it is useful to consider 
the ways in which post-communism emerged in different countries, since this 
should enhance an understanding of the reasons why public attitudes towards 
the constructive potential of the state can vary from country to country, and 
why the nexus between démocratisation and a strong state is more complex 
than is sometimes acknowledged.
Although the very timing of the anti-communist revolutions makes it clear 
that there was something of a collective momentum in Eastern Europe and the
11 One of the more bizarre allegations of increasing dictatorship is provided by Kyrgyzstan. 
In April 1993, President Akayev accused the Kyrgyz parliament of becoming dictatorial, 
after it had attempted to reduce his powers.
It might be objected that an alternative to strong leadership in the kinds of situations de­
scribed here could be anarchy rather than dictatorship. The assumption here is that, given 
the situation pertaining in most post-communist countries, anarchy would be a temporary 




























































































USSR in the late-1980s and early-1990s in line with the so-called ‘reverse 
domino’ theory, it should not be assumed that the nature of the revolution was 
essentially the same in each case. Indeed, analysts such as Charles Tilly (1993) 
have argued that many of the countries now described as post-communist ei­
ther did not or may not have experience(d) revolutions in the period 1989-91. 
Tilly reaches this conclusion by applying his own definition and model of 
revolution to the various countries of the region and discovering that some do 
not meet all of his criteria (see esp. 8-15 and 233-6). He is justified in high­
lighting the fact that the paths to post-communism were very diverse. While 
the Romanian case was violent12 *, most of the others were remarkably peace­
ful. Whereas the revolutionary transformation was essentially forced from 
below in Czechoslovakia, it was the communist leadership that took most of 
the decisive steps in Hungary'3. But if countries that had essentially had com­
mand economies and one-party political systems in the late-1980s had by the 
early-1990s taken major steps towards both marketisation and privatisation 
and multi-party political systems (let alone the various other transitions re­
ferred to earlier), then there can be little doubt that a revolution has taken 
place. The events of 1989-91 mean simply that some of the long-standing con­
ventions in theories of revolution, such as that there must be violence (see 
Cohan 1975, 25), need re-assessment, not that revolutions did not really occur 
simply because actual events do not accord with pre-existing models14. But for 
our purposes, the most important point to note here is that the moves away 
from authoritarianism and towards democracy were in some cases taken by the 
state.
The point has been reached at which the intended meanings of this paper’s 
title can be explored. As already indicated, many assume — or did in the early- 
1990s, before the current mood of pessimism set in — that post-communist 
states would be democratic, unlike their predecessors. It is premature to ad­
dress this issue at this stage of the argument. But it is already clear that the 
revolution that resulted in the current transitional status of so many countries 
was in some cases initiated from above, and that the fragility and cultural 
legacy of many countries mean that too much démocratisation too quickly in 
several states could be dysfunctional and ultimately result in new dictatorships. 
It is this essentially neo-institutional argument that leads me to use the term 
‘state democracy’. For the purposes of this paper, this means that the state — 
or, more precisely, elements of the state — both introduces the démocratisation
12 Officially, between 689 and 1033 people were killed — Rady 1992, 121.
13 The latter is in line with neo-institutional analyses of revolution, most obviously Skocpol 
1979.




























































































process and, more significantly, attempts to keep control over this process for 
justifiable reasons (i.e. on the assumption that a controlled process is more 
likely to bring about full and durable democracy, so that control is seen as a 
form of responsible government and conducive to democracy at this stage)15. 
The term state democracy therefore has a positive, constructive connotation 
here; it is, subject to the caveat in footnote 15, state-guided démocratisation. 
Such a form of state-led and -controlled démocratisation is vital in the transi­
tion phase. At the same time, it is accepted that there will at some point have to 
be a shift towards a broader conception o f democracy if transitional states are 
to become full democracies; this point is considered further in the conclusions. 
It is now appropriate to consider what both democracy and démocratisation 
might mean.
On Democracy and Démocratisation
The literature on what democracy might mean and entail is vast, and it is 
way beyond the parameters of the present paper even to outline some of the 
major approaches16. But a working model is necessary if current develop­
ments in the post-communist world are to be assessed. For the purposes of this 
paper, the following are considered to be salient features of a large-scale, 
workable and sustainable democracy (model adapted from L. Holmes 1994, 
313-4):
' 6 The term ‘state democracy’ rather than ‘state démocratisation’ is used here, despite my 
awareness of problems connected with it. One reason is that ‘state démocratisation’ can 
imply démocratisation of the state itself, rather than the broader societal démocratisation 
with which I am principally concerned. Another is that, as the sub-title of this working 
paper indicates, the focus here is on transitional, radically changing societies; the term 
state democracy — in this dynamic context — represents a peculiar form of democracy in 
which the role of the state is far greater than it would be in an ideal-type or even an actu­
ally existing established liberal democracy. In this sense, the term can be compared with 
the concept of ‘state socialism’. Finally, it might appear that the most appropriate term 
would have been ‘state-led démocratisation’. But this term is also problematic, since it 
can imply that civil society is playing a significant role in the overall démocratisation pro­
ject, in which the state is playing merely a facilitating role; given the sorry state of civil 
society in so many post-communist countries, it should be obvious why this term’s ap­
propriateness must be questioned. While the state is to play an important facilitating role 
in the transition stage — in terms of establishing institutions, passing appropriate legisla­
tion, etc. — it also needs to take a major lead in forming a political discourse and culture 
conducive to the emergence of democracy in a broad sense.
*6 For a useful introduction, and either nine or twelve models depending on how they are 




























































































1. competitive election of ruling elites, and political pluralism more gen­
erally: the latter includes a plurality of non-exclusive political parties, and 
elections that are held regularly, reasonably frequently, and that are genuinely 
competitive and secret;
2. a division of powers between the two or three main arms of the formal 
ruling part of the political system (i.e. the legislative, executive and possibly 
judicial arms), and a system of checks and balances;
3. a pluralistic approach to socialisation, especially in the areas of educa­
tion and the mass media; moreover, these two areas must be free to question 
and criticise the regime and system;
4. full acceptance by both the state and society of diverse belief systems, 
notably religious, within the limits of the law;
5. respect for minority rights;
6. the rule of law;
7. a dominant political culture that both accepts and expects the first six 
points, and that encourages (and legitimises) political participation.
Whole books could be and have been written on any one of the above vari­
ables. For the purposes of this paper, only one will be partly elaborated, viz. 
the concept of the rule of law. In the following analysis, this is taken to con­
note two things. First, everyone in a given society is subject to the same basic 
and known rules, and no one individual or small group of individuals can 
either arbitrarily and suddenly change them or exempt themselves from them. 
The personalisation of power and subjectivity of the law that was typical of 
Ceausescu’s Romania, for instance, would — unsurprisingly — disqualify such 
a system from labelling itself a rule of law state. Second, and borrowing from 
a definition of constitutionalism provided by Claus Offe in a March 1996 
seminar in Melbourne, the legislative process and institutional politics more 
generally occur overwhelmingly within a pre-existing framework of rules, as 
distinct from being concerned primarily with creating the rules.
The above is an idealised model; even many Western systems fall short of 




























































































racy, which is the conception of democracy as the telos adopted here17. This 
said, there is no assumption that only one version of liberal democracy exists 
or can exist; on the contrary, the interpretation and actual implementation of 
each of the above variables does and should vary from country to country and 
even within one country over time. Such a plurality of interpretations is surely 
a key feature of liberal democracy. Despite such (unavoidable and desirable) 
conceptual fuzziness, the model provides a theoretical framework against 
which to test actual developments, or the absence of them, in the post-com­
munist world.
The process by which a given country/society moves towards the model is 
what is meant here by démocratisation; it is one important component of 
transition (for an interesting blend of theoretical and empirical studies of 
democracy and démocratisation see Parry and Moran 1994). The next section 
will examine the progress, or lack of it, that has been made in the post-com­
munist world in terms of the seven variables. The analysis will necessarily be 
generalised and superficial; but it is hoped that the picture painted is not too 
far from perceived reality, and can serve as a starting point for debate.
Démocratisation Moves in the Post-Communist World
One of the most visible signs of change in eastern Europe and the FSU in 
the 1990s has been the emergence of genuine political competition. This can be 
seen in the legalisation of competitive political parties and in the holding of 
genuinely competitive elections, both presidential and parliamentary.
The legalisation of political parties occurred in many countries of the re­
gion in the closing stages of the communist era. Nevertheless, it is the post­
communist period that has witnessed the consolidation of multi-party ar­
rangements and the régularisation of competitive parliamentary elections. By 
now, every European and Eurasian post-communist state except Turkmenistan 
has held at least one parliamentary election18 in which competition between 
political parties has been more or less genuine. The term ‘more or less’ is used 
to highlight the fact that there have been charges of bias and manipulation in
17 The explicit reference to liberal democracy and a telos here is to counter possible objec­
tions that the seven-point model advocated conflicts with the peculiar version of democ­
racy I have allowed for in fn. 9.




























































































several countries; Albania is a recent case (May-June 1996 — see Schmidt 
1996). In some, re-named and somewhat re-vamped communist parties have 
made allegations of unfair treatment, for instance on the grounds that much of 
their property has been sequestered, leaving them less able to finance election 
campaigns. But such allegations should in most cases be taken with a pinch of 
salt; two resources such parties typically continue to have long after their 
buildings have been confiscated is political experience and a well-developed 
organisational infra-structure. This puts them well ahead of most of the brand 
new parties of post-communism19. More persuasive are charges from non­
communist parties of media bias. But even these have in most cases been less 
serious than they might have been. In sum, and despite hiccoughs, there is now 
real political competition in almost the entire region.
In terms of membership, most political parties are non-exclusive; indeed, 
most welcome new members with open arms. Moreover, the sheer number of 
parties in most post-communist states, and the large numbers that contest elec­
tions, testify on one level to the relatively open access to the political arena and 
hence the right to participate that is emphasised by so many theorists of 
democracy. The facts that most parties have comparatively small memberships 
and that the presence of so many parties in many parliaments makes compro­
mise and effective decision-making more difficult does not alter the fact that 
most post-communist states already meet the minimum standards of citizen 
participation and choice to be labelled democratic by some analysts (see e.g. 
Mueller 1996).
The post-communist states have opted for a range of electoral systems, 
though most more or less approximate to three main models. The first is 
related to the German system, in which citizens have two votes — one for an 
individual on a first-past-the-post system in single-member constituencies, and 
another for a party-list in multi-member constituencies that are eventually 
filled on a proportional representation (p.r.) basis with a minimum threshold 
for representation. Arrangements very similar to this system have been op­
erating in Albania and Georgia. A slight variation is where there are single­
member constituencies as in the German version, but a single nationwide con­
stituency filled by p.r; this arrangement can be found in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Croatia, Lithuania, and Russia.





























































































The second system is based solely on p.r., although some countries have 
exclusively multi-member constituencies, while others have both multi-mem­
ber constituencies and a single nationwide constituency. This arrangement can 
be found in Bulgaria (though the system is more complex than elaborated 
here), Czechia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although this 
system does not have the single-member constituencies that the first group has, 
the influence of the German system can be seen both in the way the propor­
tional distribution operates, and in the inclusion of minimum thresholds for 
representation. These thresholds range from as low as 2% in Albania and 3% 
in Croatia and Romania right up to 11 % for large blocs in Czechia. Finally, in 
what is one of the most complicated electoral systems in the world, Hungary 
has opted for an arrangement that blends both the first and second models.
The third group of countries has opted for single-member constituencies 
and no proportional representation. But this does not necessarily mean they 
operate on a British style simple majority basis. In fact, many have both abso­
lute majority requirements (using French style run-off systems) and minimum 
turnout requirements that are often as high as 50%. The latter component, in 
particular, has led to severe problems in some countries, where many parlia­
mentary seats have remained unfilled even after several rounds of balloting. 
Countries opting for this arrangement include Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz­
stan, the Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan.
Just as there is no agreement among post-communist states on the optimal 
arrangements for electing parliaments, so is there no consensus on how best to 
choose the head of state. The majority of countries have opted for direct elec­
tions, usually with run-off provisions. The Russian system is thus typical of 
most countries’. But a sizeable minority of countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herce- 
govina, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, rump Yugoslavia — and just one former 
Soviet republic, Latvia) has opted for indirect presidential elections, some with 
run-off provisions. While the vast majority of presidential elections have been 
contested, they were not in Albania (April 1992), Azerbaijan (October 1993), 
Kazakhstan (December 1991), Moldova (December 1991), or Turkmenistan 
(June 1992); in terms of our model of démocratisation, this absence of com­
petition is of concern. It is of even greater concern given that the position of 
the president is a powerful one in all of these countries20. One final disturbing
20 This statement might appear to contradict the argument here in favour of strong leader­
ship. But it does not, for two reasons. First, competition for leadership positions has 
been advocated consistently. Second, an argument in favour of plurality within leader­




























































































development is the holding of referenda in three of the Central Asian states 
(Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in recent years to enable the in­
cumbent presidents to extend their current terms without having to hold even 
indirect and/or uncontested elections. This extension of office appears to be to 
enable the incumbents to circumvent constitutional limitations on the number 
of times (usually once) a given individual may stand for re-election.
Most post-communist states by now have new constitutions that attempt to 
define a division of labour between the executive and the legislature. More­
over, several have or intend to have constitutional courts along the lines of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, one of the tasks of which is to arbitrate 
between the executive and legislative branches in cases of disagreement. This 
overt division represents a marked break with the past; gone is the ideological 
straitjacket and hierarchy of democratic centralism and the leading role of the 
party. This is not to deny that there have been sometimes serious teething 
problems of implementation in the earliest days of post-communism. The 
shutting down of parliaments by Yeltsin and Walesa mentioned above are 
prime examples. In the Polish case, the closure was in line with Poland’s 
interim constitutional arrangements effective at that time, and in this sense of 
less concern than Yeltsin’s actions. The latter were declared unconstitutional 
by the Russian Constitutional Court — which encouraged Yeltsin to shut down 
the court itself in October 1993 (see Reid 1995). But in both the Polish and 
Russian cases, the presidents quickly organised new parliamentary elections, 
despite fears in some quarters that the two countries were heading towards 
presidential dictatorship. In both cases, these elections produced legislatures 
that were ill-disposed towards the respective presidents; yet neither Walesa nor 
Yeltsin attempted to close or seriously limit the new parliaments. Moreover, 
Yeltsin signed a new law on the constitutional court in July 1994, with the 
court becoming operational again in February 1995. And Walesa accepted, 
albeit reluctantly, the results of the November 1995 presidential elections that 
replaced him with someone (Kwasniewski) ideologically close to the parlia­
ment with which Walesa himself had had so many disputes. To summarise, 
there have been serious glitches in this area too, but the overall record on the 
division of powers is, in the circumstances, encouraging 21.
Compared with the communist era, the main agencies of socialisation have 
in most countries become freer and more pluralistic. Religious education in 21
21 On the conflicts between presidents, prime ministers and parliaments in the post-com­
munist world see Baylis 1996 and the various articles in Transition, 2/25 (1996), 5-27. 




























































































schools is now permitted in most countries, and private education has been 
legalised. This is not to deny that there is cause for concern in several states. 
For example, in August 1995 Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
announced his intention to replace all post-communist school textbooks with 
books from the Soviet era. But, once again, the overall trend on this 
démocratisation factor is basically encouraging22. The media are also gener­
ally much freer, even though it must be acknowledged that recent develop­
ments in, inter alia, Slovakia and Croatia, are disturbing. In both of these 
countries, journalists can be and have been charged for making overly critical 
remarks about the president and political institutions23.
Only one communist state, Albania, ever formally outlawed religion. But 
most communist states harassed religious groups at various times, and none 
fully legitimised the organised church (see Miller and Rigby 1986). The situa­
tion has now improved dramatically. Not only is religion universally tolerated, 
but some post-communist governments are even emphasising their warm rela­
tions with the church. If anything, there is a slight danger of church and state 
becoming too close for those who oppose the notion of establishmentarianism 
on the grounds that, in a democracy, it tends to lead to excessive overlap 
between what should be separate organisations.
The official treatment of minorities has not invariably been sensitive in the 
post-communist world, and some of the most basic rights of some groups have 
been ensured only because of external pressure on governments. The most ex­
treme cases of abuse of rights have been well documented in the Western me­
dia, and include ethnic cleansing and/or genocide in both the former 
Yugoslavia and the FSU. Less dramatic examples include highly exclusive citi­
zenship rights (notably in Estonia and Latvia), differential rights of access to 
social welfare provisions (e.g. in Slovakia), and police harassment of groups 
such as the Romanies. Then there are more debatable cases, such as the right 
of ethnic minorities to form political parties on the basis of their ethnicity. 
Whether or not this is, or should be seen as, a basic democratic right is open to 
question, in that it is by many definitions an exclusionary ‘right’. But clearly 
some ethnic minorities believe it should be a right, and there have been major
22 On educational changes under post-communism see Jones 1994; Karsten and Majoor 
1994; Glenn 1995.
23 Examples include the law suits filed in May 1996 against two editors of the Croatian 
weekly Feral Tribune for alleged libel against President Tudjman and against the editor of 
Sme in Slovakia for alleged attacks on the Slovak cabinet. For similar evidence from 
Kyrgyzstan, July 1995, see Labyrinth, 2/4 (1995), 7. More generally on the status of the 




























































































political debates about it in countries such as Albania and Bulgaria. In these 
particular cases, compromises were struck whereby parties that originally rep­
resented only Greeks and Turks respectively were permitted to exist, despite 
Albanian and Bulgarian rules forbidding ethnically-based parties, as long as 
they permitted membership to anyone who wanted to join.
Although there are many clearly undemocratic policies towards ethnic mi­
norities, and some policies that are open to radically different interpretations, 
it should not be overlooked that some post-communist states have adopted 
comparatively very inclusive policies on citizenship, access to social welfare, 
etc. Examples include Moldova and Czechia. In the latter, for instance, the one 
Romany deputy to parliament (until the May-June 1996 elections) spoke out in 
favour of the recent, more inclusive, changes to Czech citizenship law. And in 
May 1996, the Hungarian Supreme Court passed its first sentence for racially- 
inspired crime (OMRI Daily Digest, Pt.2, 17 May 1996).
Ethnicity is only one form of identity and one criterion by which 
‘minorities’ might be held to exist. Another is sexuality, and here the picture 
reveals a marked increase in official tolerance and equity of treatment in many 
countries. No longer is homosexuality typically ‘swept under the carpet’ as it 
usually was in the communist era (Castro’s Cuba recognises it but treats it as 
an illness); many states have now both recognised and legalised it. Indeed, 
while this is not yet typical of the post-communist world, it is worth noting 
that Hungary recently granted common law rights to homosexual couples 
(other than the right to adopt children — all from OMRI Daily Digest, Pt.2, 22 
May 1996), making that country more inclusive in terms of civil rights than 
many Western states.
Women constitute approximately half the population in post-communist 
states, as elsewhere, so that it would on one level be absurd to consider their 
position in a section on minority rights. However, if their political representa­
tion in both the communist and post-communist eras is examined, they are 
clearly under-represented, and so have a minority ‘voice’ relative to their 
numbers. Their position has in many ways deteriorated under post-commu­
nism. While this is yet another issue that deserves much fuller consideration 
than is feasible here, suffice it to say that their numerical representation in 
parliaments has declined markedly in the 1990s (for details see Table 9.1 in L. 
Holmes 1997a, 258). However, three points need to be made relative to the 
discussion here. First, the marked decline is, perhaps ironically, a function of 
‘démocratisation’, in that the communists used to allocate seats on a quota 




























































































ceteris paribus, it is arguably better to have only 3% ‘voice’ in a legislature in 
which issues are openly debated and in which there are genuine votes than a 
30% presence in a body in which all activity is very much controlled. Finally, 
women are proportionately under-represented everywhere, including in West­
ern ‘democracies’24. This said, the average for female representation in tran­
sition legislatures in June 1994 was 8% — one per cent less than the world 
average, and fully 10% lower than the Western average (Morvant 1995, 8)25 26.
As for other belief systems, countries such as Albania are still banning 
communist or quasi-communist organisations; Yeltsin also tried to in Russia, 
but was eventually overruled by the Constitutional Court. While this is under­
standable in terms of recent history, and while even the mighty USA has long 
taken measures against communists (as did the FRG in the 1970s with its 
Berufsverbot), it must be questioned whether or not it is appropriate to ban 
any political organisation in a true democracy. The usual argument put for­
ward by democratic theorists in favour of selective bans is that there should be 
restrictions on, or even outlawing of, organisations that seek to undermine 
and/or overthrow democracy, especially if the measures advocated by such or­
ganisations include violence and other illegal acts. While this might justify the 
clampdown on some extremist organisations in the post-communist world, 
including violently racist ones2f>, the communist parties or their successors are 
for the most part more democratic than their Stalinist predecessors — the Rus­
sian Communist Workers’ Party and the Stalinist Party of Georgia perhaps 
being exceptions! — and should be given the benefit of the doubt until their 
actions or public pronouncements suggest otherwise.
It was pointed out above that the rule of law would be analysed in this paper 
in terms of two variables, the depersonalisation of politics and the predomi­
nance of legislative work by rules rather than on rules. How do the post-com­
munist states measure up?
Most post-communist states have been making progress towards the deper­
sonalisation of politics. One area in which this is visible is in the laws on 
disclosure. In their endeavours to increase both regime and system legiti­
24 As of May 1996, the best country in the world according to this criterion was Sweden, 
with 40.4%.
25 For much fuller consideration of numerous aspects of gender politics in the post-com­
munist world see Corrin 1992; Einhom 1993; Funk and Mueller 1993; Rueschemeyer 
1994; and Transition, 1/16 (1995), 2-28.
26 On right-wing extremism see J. Held 1993; Hockenos 1993; and the entire issue of 




























































































mation, many post-communist legislators have been introducing laws that 
require officials, including parliamentarians, to declare all sources of income 
and to avoid potential conflict of interest situations. Many of these officials are 
aware that much of the public has been associating the economic ‘system’ of 
early post-communism with organised crime and corruption; only by 
introducing and implementing laws that seek to address the ethical problems of 
economic crime and corruption can post-communist legislators and other 
officials hope to alter the perception common in many countries that post­
communism is in fact a state of lawlessness27. Poland introduced this kind of 
disclosure legislation in 1992, yet is typical in not yet taking it far enough 
(Jaskiemia 1995, 33-5) 28.
Although much progress has been made in depersonalisation, the above- 
mentioned trend away from regular direct presidential elections towards ex­
tension of tenure on the basis of popular referenda in several Central Asian 
states is by most criteria a cause for concern to those looking for démocratisa­
tion in these countries.
One other area in which there is mixed evidence on depersonalisation is 
allegations of corruption by senior officials. In cases where such charges have 
been laid against top officials of the communist era, it is understandable that 
many would perceive this as an attempt by post-communist officials to boost 
their own legitimacy or even to wreak revenge. Hence, such cases are not evi­
dence of depersonalisation and extending the law to cover all. But what of 
allegations against top officials of the post-communist era? There have cer­
tainly been many allegations, and several senior people (e.g. Albania’s first 
post-communist prime minister, who was re-appointed as prime minister in 
July 1997, Fatos Nano; Russian security minister Viktor Barannikov; the head 
of the Czech privatisation agency, Jaroslav Lizner) have either resigned to 
avoid embarrassment or have been found guilty and punished29. But it is quite
27 For survey evidence suggesting serious public concern about crime and corruption see 
Rose and Haerpfer 1994b, 21-2.
28 The Hungarians passed a relatively comprehensive new ‘conflict of interest’ law in 
February 1997, following two years of heated debate — see OMRI Daily Digest, Pt. 2 ,4  
June 1996; and Russia appears to be moving towards one, albeit slowly.
29 Offers to resign are not invariably accepted. Thus a major scandal erupted in Russia in 
November 1997, when one of Yeltsin’s most favoured and trusted colleagues. First 
Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Anatolii Chubais, was found to have ac­
cepted an abnormally large advance for his contribution to a forthcoming book on the 
Russian privatisation process. While most of the money was allegedly not to have gone 
into Chubais’ own pocket, and although what he had done was not technically illegal, his 
advance had been made by a publisher owned by a major bank to which Chubais had 




























































































clear that many allegations against senior political actors have been made on 
the basis of little or no real evidence, and are less a reflection of a law-abiding 
state than of somewhat unethical attempts at point-scoring against political 
competitors. The list of such cases is extremely long, and I have explored the 
issue at length elsewhere (L. Holmes 1997b). For our purposes, the salient 
point is that ‘revelations’ about corruption among high-ranking officials in the 
post-communist world sometimes represent moves towards the rule-of-law and 
the depersonalisation of politics, but just as frequently reflect grubby and 
highly personalised politics. Conversely, the major witch-hunt that some 
feared as post-communist governments announced their lustration laws has not 
materialised30, which analysts such as Wiktor Osiatynski (1994) have seen as 
one of the most encouraging signs of political maturity by post-communist 
regimes.
As indicated above, the majority of post-communist states have by now 
introduced brand new constitutions (notable exceptions being Hungary and 
Albania, while Poland’s new constitution did not become effective until late- 
199731) ancj have established constitutional courts (see Schwartz 1993; East 
European Constitutional Review, 6/1 [1997], 61-93; Schwartz 1997). Most 
countries have also adopted new laws on political parties, electoral procedures, 
etc. In these senses, the ‘rules of the game’ have been formally established. 
Unfortunately, even where the formal rules have been laid down, some states 
do not fully abide by them, sometimes in significant ways. A prime example is 
Czechia. According to the constitution adopted in December 1992, the Czech 
Republic was to have a bicameral legislature. Although an upper chamber was 
eventually established in December 1996, its lengthy delay was caused primar­
ily because many members of the lower house had opposed the concept (on the 
new Czech Senate see Olson 1996). In many other cases, some rules are still 
more ambiguous and contested than would be desirable in fragile transitional
scandal breaking. Although Yeltsin sacked the others implicated in the scandal, including 
the privatisation minister Maksim Boiko, and while he did dismiss Chubais as Finance 
Minister, he retained the latter as First Deputy Prime Minister, largely on the grounds that 
the economic reform process needed Chubais’ skills and ideas. However, the Russian 
President also announced that there would be a formal investigation of the whole affair by 
the Procurator-General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Security 
Service, and it remains to be seen whether or not Chubais will retain his position. For 
further details see RFE/RL’s weekdaily on-line service Newsline on the web for Novem­
ber 1997.
30 The former GDR and Albania are partial exceptions. On this whole issue see S. Holmes 
1994; Brown 1997.
31 For detailed analyses of the new Polish constitution see East European Constitutional 




























































































societies. Nevertheless, many post-communist countries are beginning to settle 
into new patterns of behaviour.
Our seventh variable is difficult to measure. Some analysts claim that most 
post-communist citizens have now rejected democracy, and cite survey data to 
support their argument (see Gati 1996, esp. 177-81). For reasons too lengthy 
to elaborate here, such interpretations of the survey data are often question­
able. Even if they were not, however, it is far too early to draw conclusions 
about dominant political culture in the post-communist countries; citizen atti­
tudes still change rapidly in many cases, which suggests that underlying values 
on several important matters are unstable, conflicting, or perhaps even non­
existent.
Conclusions
It has been demonstrated that many post-communist countries have made 
rapid and considerable progress towards our seven variables, but also that 
there have been problems. In short, troubled démocratisation has been occur- 
ring32. it is now an appropriate juncture at which to consider three important 
theoretical points. First, has democracy been reached? Second, when will it be 
possible to claim that democracy has been consolidated? Finally, what is the 
relationship between the democratic state and state democracy, and between 
both of them and democracy generally?
Many leading theorists of democracy, from Schumpeter (1943, esp. 269- 
273) to Sartori (1987) and Di Palma (1990, esp. 16), argue that in a mass 
society where direct democracy is impracticable, contestation open to partici­
pation (to use Robert Dahl’s formulation) is a sufficient condition for a system 
to be labelled democratic. This minimalist interpretation of democracy, which 
focuses essentially on the first of our seven criteria and is sometimes called the 
procedural approach, specifies necessary criteria but is insufficient. Neverthe­
less, there is an influential group by whose criteria democracy has already 32
32 In a longer paper, and if it were considered worthwhile, countries could be grouped in 
terms of how much progress they have made towards democracy. This is a favourite 
pastime of many transitologists, and interested readers may care to consider the tax­
onomies in, inter alia, Agh (1993), Lewis (1993) and Gati (1996). Most commonly, and 
for good reason, the Visegrad countries (nowadays excluding Slovakia) are considered 
the most advanced, the Central Asian states the least, with other countries falling at vari­




























































































been reached in most post-communist states33. Considering this from a slightly 
different perspective, Schmitter and Karl (1994) argue that the transition to 
democracy has already occurred, and that many post-communist states are now 
at the stage of consolidation.
Such minimalist, essentially institutionalist approaches to democracy are 
inadequate. Many focus too much on variable one in our model. Even those 
that focus on other variables, especially our second, are too narrow if they do 
not incorporate the seventh variable. After all, we are here considering 
democracy, not démocratisation. In order to reduce confusion, we can now 
talk of the minimalist approach to democracy and full democracy; the latter is 
considered here to be something more or less achievable, while still falling 
short of ideal-type or pure democracy. Moreover, since transition can refer to 
so many different phenomena, it is preferable to refer to stages of démocrati­
sation leading to full democracy; in this approach, what the minimalists call 
democracy is, in the context of post-communist states at least, seen only as the 
first — albeit significant — stage on the path to democracy.
It follows from the above that it is not accepted here that democracy can be 
reached and then consolidated. What many call the consolidation of democracy 
is better called the second or consolidation stage of either démocratisation or 
democratic transition34. In this simple sense, the second theoretical question 
does not require an answer, since it is based on a false premiss. However, to 
leave the issue at that would be an evasion, a semantic game. The question 
needs to be reformulated as ‘When will full democracy be reached?’. This 
cannot be answered to complete satisfaction, partly because no country fully 
meets all seven criteria. But, if readers will permit such an opaque and intu­
itive approach, the working answer is that full democracy will be reached 
when countries are perceived to be ‘close’ — who can be more precise? — to 
all seven variables, not least the seventh. In terms of recognising this stage, 
minimalist approaches to achieving democracy such as Samuel Huntington’s
33 Returning to the question raised in footnote 10, Russia has according to this approach 
clearly been a democracy since at least late-1993.
34 While the debates about transition, transformation and consolidation can at times border 
on the precious, it does make sense to distinguish two major stages of transition. Follow­
ing Bryant and Mokrzycki (1994), the first stage — transformation — is seen here to be 
primarily concerned with overcoming the past, and incorporates only a hazy vision of the 
way forward. In the second or consolidating stage, countries look more to the future than 
to the past, and focus on refining institutions and practices conducive to what have by 
now emerged as more clearly formulated objectives. Using this approach is one way of 
encapsulating significant differences between post-communist countries. Thus Russia 





























































































‘two election’ test, are rejected here as simplistic and inadequate. A much 
more satisfactory approach is that of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996, 
esp.5), who in turn derive the term from Giuseppe Di Palma, when they refer 
to democracy being widely recognised as ‘the only game in town’. In terms of 
determining whether or not this stage has been reached, Linz and Stepan them­
selves provide a sensible range of appropriate indicators (1996, esp. 5-15). As 
a more general guideline, however, it can be argued that democracy can be 
seen to be ‘the only game in town’ when it is widely accepted both within and 
outside a given country that the democratic system — as distinct from a par­
ticular regime — will still be there in ten years’ time, even if there is a major 
economic crisis. This criterion would at present distinguish even the most suc­
cessful post-communist states, including Poland, from most Western states.
Finally, what of the strong state and its relationship to democracy? If we 
accept the argument of writers such as Przeworski (1991, esp. 10) that it is the 
people that determine the outcomes of the democratic process, then the term 
‘state democracy’ might at first sight appear to be an oxymoron. After all, if it 
is leaders who determine the rules and what happens, surely this cannot be 
democratic, and the statement made earlier that there might need to be strong 
leadership to ensure democracy begins to look absurd. But this statement is 
neither absurd nor contradictory, for three principal reasons.
First, the minimalist approach is quite compatible with strong leadership, 
since it has little to say about the latter theoretically. For those favouring a 
more substantive approach, there are two further reasons why the notion of 
strong leadership need not be antithetical to the concept of democracy. The 
first focuses on the distinction drawn here between democracy and démocrati­
sation, or between end-goal and the process of reaching that telos. For a true 
democracy to exist, there must be both an institutional framework and set of 
rules and a democratic political culture. But in a phase of political science in 
which we so often focus on the subjectivities of identity, and the notion not 
only of imagined but also constructed communities, it should be abundantly 
clear that democratic culture does not just suddenly appear; the preconditions 
have to exist before the culture can develop and consolidate. Unfortunately, 
some participants in recent debates about civil society and the state have juxta­
posed these two concepts too starkly, and have not appreciated that in a 
democracy, they are organically linked, interactive, mutually dependent and 
mutually legitimising. Given the communist legacy inherited by the post-com­
munist states, it is incumbent on post-communist politicians to create the insti­
tutional framework that is a prerequisite for the growth of a democratic cul­




























































































relation!) persuasively argue, what is needed in the post-communist world is a 
strong state if democracy beyond the minimalist form and an active civil soci­
ety are to develop.
Moreover, strong leadership need not be equated with strong leadership by 
an individual. If the state as a relatively abstract entity — though it always 
comprises people, with all their whims, prejudices and other subjectivities — is 
run by an elite that has won its right to manage it in comparatively open 
competition and is internally pluralistic in the sense of there being a division 
of labour and relative autonomy of the component parts, then both our first 
and second conditions have been met, and a country is that much closer to 
democracy.
In short, the argument here is for a strong state, especially during the 
démocratisation phase. This is in line with Stephen Holmes’ argument just 
cited. Unfortunately, Holmes does not sufficiently address the all-important 
question of how one creates this strong state in the early days of post-commu­
nism ^. The last part of this paper focuses on this crucial issue.
Holmes justifiably and convincingly argues that culturalist arguments 
against the likelihood of post-communist countries becoming truly democratic 
must at least be seriously questioned, perhaps even jettisoned. As he points out, 
given the circumstances of its birth, the really surprising aspect of post-com­
munism is how little conflict (including ethnic) there has been, not how much. 
When it is borne in mind that the UNHCR has recently estimated that there are 
some 164 territorial disputes ‘based on ethnic issues’ in the FSU alone36, 
Holmes’ contention seems particularly apt — the Nagorno-Karabakhs, Chech- 
nyas and Bosnias notwithstanding. Very crudely, his argument seems to be that 
if societies are not as racist, ethnically-divided and anti-democratic as they are 
often portrayed, problems in creating a solid democratic base might relate 
more to weaknesses in the state than to problems in society.
Holmes’ questioning of cultural reductionism is welcome. But if states are 
weak, we need to ask why. At this point, it is worth examining what is meant 
by culturalist arguments. There is an important difference between statements
36 Indeed, if Holmes’ plea in an earlier article were to be heeded, new constitutions would 
only slowly be adopted in the post-communist world; on one level, this could render it 
easier for a strong state to become authoritarian or dictatorial, thus having the opposite ef­
fect on démocratisation from that intended by Holmes (see S. Holmes 1995).
36 I.e. even before one begins to consider eastern Europe; UN report cited in OMRI Daily 




























































































such as ‘the Poles are ungovernable’ or ‘the Russians are simply not market- 
oriented, unlike the Chinese’ and the argument that ‘Russians and Poles do not 
have a tradition of political compromise, which is why they find it difficult to 
make democracy effective’. The first two statements are generic and, ulti­
mately, racist. The third, in contrast, does not suggest that Russians and Poles 
are inherently different from other people (such as ‘Westerners’), merely that 
they have had different political experiences in recent years, which has impli­
cations for their attitudes towards democracy and the many values that, at least 
for those not totally committed to crude versions of rational choice theory, are 
associated with it (respect for the rules of the game, a willingness to compro­
mise, etc.37). According to this argument, then, the problems of creating a 
strong but not authoritarian state do relate to political culture, but not to any 
ethnic attributes.
This argument needs further refinement, however. Differences in the ability 
of indigenous elites to create strong but democratic states relate partly to the 
scale of problems faced by particular countries. Ceteris paribus, the more nu­
merous and the more serious the problems, the greater the likelihood of po­
larised viewpoints, and hence the greater the difficulties of reaching compro­
mise positions. This argument has now incorporated a structural or contextual 
component, in addition to the political cultural one, even though it is accepted 
here that some of the problems that distinguish one country’s chances from 
another’s can ultimately be seen as cultural. It is argued here, for instance, that 
Russia has greater problems than many other countries in creating a strong 
state partly because it is much bigger (a purely structural problem of coordi­
nation) and partly because it suffers from identity problems that are worse 
than in most other post-communist states. As 1 have argued elsewhere (L. 
Holmes 1993), what bound many politicians and citizens in most countries in 
the earliest days of post-communism was the common relief of having rejected 
external domination, whether it was by the USSR (in the case of most of East­
ern Europe), Russia (within the USSR) or Serbia (within the Former 
Yugoslavia). In contrast, Russia lost an empire it had ruled, in parts and in 
some senses, since at least 1721. That this identity crisis has been a major fac­
tor explaining the inability to reach consensus is seen in the major foci of the 
Russian presidential campaigns of 1996. While there were also important dif­
ferences over economic policy, probably the single biggest theme Zyuganov 
pushed in his endeavours to discredit Yeltsin was that the Russian president





























































































permitted the breakup of the USSR (i.e. the Russian empire) and might even 
be planning to do the same to Russia itself38.
In sum, both cultural and structural reasons help to explain why many post­
communist states have been less strong than they need to be at this stage of 
démocratisation. But the cultural factors relate closely to recent political ex­
periences39. Unfortunately, many post-communist politicians and some West­
ern observers appear to assume that a strong individual leader is anathema40, 
but do not appreciate that strong collective leadership is both necessary and 
compatible with many conceptions of what might be called ‘really existing 
democracy’. It may be asked how compromise politics, which is at this stage 
an unavoidable consequence of collective leadership in many countries, can be 
defined as strong. Meanings depend partly on context; in a situation of extreme 
problems — by some criteria, crisis even — compromise policies that at least 
are policies that can be implemented are better than no policies at all. If the 
word ‘compromise’ is changed to ‘consensus-based’, the tone immediately 
changes, even though the content may not have done.
To finish, let us return to Stephen Holmes. He appears to be arguing in his 
1996 piece that the notion of only societal démocratisation is at least incom­
plete, perhaps even meaningless. He is correct in this. Democracy is about 
political power, and that necessarily involves the state, whatever some advo­
cates of new (notably social movement) or postmodern politics may claim. 
Unless there is démocratisation of the state, which itself plays a crucial role in 
general démocratisation, there cannot be meaningful démocratisation of soci­
ety. As Holmes (S. Holmes 1996, 49) argues, ‘Liberalization cannot succeed 
under conditions of state collapse, for democratization of state authority is 
pointless if no state authority exists’.
In order to achieve the strong state needed at this stage of post-communism 
to ensure all-round démocratisation, without risking the imposition of dicta­
torship, post-communist law-makers must learn both vicariously (e.g. from 
Weimar Germany) and from their own experiences. They must pass electoral 
laws that help to reduce the number of parties in parliament; several already 
have, and have achieved the desired result of moving closer towards what 
might eventually be legitimately described as party systems41. One method for
38 See too the communist charges against Yeltsin cited in Dunlop 1997, 39.
39 The point made above about pre-communist traditions is again apposite here.
40 This is understandable given the actualities of communist rule in so many countries.
4 ' For the purposes of this paper, we can talk of a party system when politics are on one 




























































































achieving this would be to introduce first-past-the-post systems, which increase 
the likelihood of de facto two-party systems. But such arrangements would 
probably need to operate on a simple majority basis, not an absolute majority 
one; even if the latter were required, they might still be manageable as long as 
there are no or only low minimum voter turnout requirements (or else com­
pulsory voting, as in Australia). The current arrangements in Belarus, Kyr­
gyzstan and Ukraine, in contrast, are clearly proving impractical, as so many 
parliamentary seats remain unfilled despite several rounds of balloting over 
many months.
It has been argued in this paper that strong leadership is in a number of 
ways necessary at the current stage of démocratisation in the post-communist 
world. It has further been argued that strong leadership need not mean strong 
leadership by an individual. What is required is strong leadership by the state. 
Full democracy — here meaning relatively close adherence to all seven vari­
ables in our model — is unrealistic at present; most ordinary citizens are so 
concerned with basic survival that it is unrealistic to expect widescale and 
meaningful participation and societal democracy. The dominant democratic 
political culture that is a key component of an established democracy cannot 
emerge overnight, and Pridham and Lewis’ suggestion (1996, 2) that it will 
probably take 12-20 years for new democracies to become established may 
prove to be over-optimistic (i.e. too short a time-span) in the case of several 
states of the FSU and perhaps also in parts of the Balkans. In the meantime, 
states must continue to put in place all the other structural prerequisites of 
democracy, and seek to make the economies stronger.
It might be objected that to argue in favour of strong states and that full lib­
eral democracy is not yet feasible may leave open the possibility that the new 
states will become increasingly authoritarian. The minimalists will counter that 
this will not occur as long as there is still competition of elites. Given the 
rejection here of purely procedural approaches, such an argument is insuffi­
cient. However, if we add to it the notions of political competition within the 
state — the messiness of conflict between presidents, prime ministers, parlia­
ments and perhaps constitutional courts — plus relatively free media, then 
there is a sufficient minimum basis to talk of meaningful démocratisation and 
eventually full democracy. Expressed in this way, it becomes obvious why it is 
misguided to ask the question ‘The Democratic State or State Democracy?’. 
Rather, the two terms are interactive and mutually necessary if some or all of
dictable parties that have policies on all major issues, and that all work more or less to the




























































































the early post-communist states are one day to become established and stable 
democracies in the way this term is normally used. In short, what is needed at 
present is the democratic state and state democracy, combined with strong 
leadership.
Whether or not continued démocratisation and eventually full democracy 
are feasible is another matter. In addition to having to carry the weight of the 
numerous problems involved in post-communist transition, state elites often 
discover that their policy options are severely circumscribed — in some cases 
virtually dictated — by external agencies such as the European Bank of Recon­
struction and Development or the International Monetary Fund. The fact that 
such powerful transnational or global organisations are themselves undemo­
cratic by even the most minimalist definition of democracy introduces a whole 
new dimension to the question of the possibilities for transitional societies of 
achieving full democracy. Unfortunately, this large, crucial and difficult issue 
lies beyond the scope of the present paper.
Leslie Holmes
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